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3. RICHARD OSBORNE, ‘“I AM A ONE IN TEN”: SUCCESS RATIOS IN THE RECORDING 
INDUSTRY’ 
 
There is a ratio that record companies repeatedly state: they claim that theirs is a 
business in which only one in ten succeeds. This figure was cited at least as early as the 
1950s and is still in use today. It masks a great deal of human fall-out. Artists’ dreams 
are shattered and projects come to nought. It could also be considered poor business 
practice: how have record companies managed to be so profligate for so long? Michael 
Jones has argued that ‘We do not have to ask why the music industry lives with such a 
high failure rate; the answer is, simply and quite brutally, because it can afford to’ 
(Jones 1997: 28). The industry works to a simple formula, calculating that ‘as little as 
10% of new material must make a profit large enough to offset losses on the majority of 
releases’ (Vogel 2011: 261).  
Yet this failure rate is worth probing further. What I wish to underline in this 
chapter is the extent to which record companies can afford failure because of failure 
itself. They do not verify the one in ten statistic, but instead employ it rhetorically. It is 
combined with a further trope: the companies claim to be risk-taking investors in new 
music. In doing so, they cast their one in ten statistic in a benevolent light. Artists are 
not failing because record companies are bad at their jobs; they are failing because 
record companies dare to push boundaries. This rationale has been employed for a 
fundamental cause, defending the economic base upon which the recording industry 
has been built. It has been used in justification of stringent aspects of recording 
contracts and it has underpinned the record companies’ claims to ownership of sound 
recording copyright. 
This chapter explores the evolution of this rhetoric. It begins by outlining the 
origins of the one in ten statistic, before tracing its prevalence within the record 
industry and its analyses within academia. It next examines the uses of the ratio when 
coupled with the employment of ‘new’ music. Finally, this chapter looks at the 
promotional literature of the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry 
(IFPI), which has recently deployed these tropes for a new cause. They are now 
defending the purpose of record companies in the digital age. 
 
The origins of the one in ten statistic 
The success ratio is tied to the risks of novelty. How do you attract consumers to a song 
they have not heard before? How do you interest them in a nascent performer? In the 
first half of the twentieth century these tasks were as likely to be undertaken by music 
publishers as they were by record companies. Giving evidence ahead of the UK’s 1911 
Copyright Act, the publishers argued that they bore the chief responsibility for finding 
and popularising hit songs. As a result, they had ‘all the big percentage of failures, and 
the small extent of success’ (Gorrell Committee 1910: 70). The record companies, in 
contrast, would ‘never take a thing unless it is popular already’ (ibid.: 53). John 
Drummond Robertson, head of the leading British manufacturer, the Gramophone 
Company, could only cite a single composition that had been ‘specially composed for the 
gramophone’ and he could not state for certain whether this ‘class of composition’ 
would grow (ibid.). 
The publishers used their low success rate tactically during these debates. A new 
right was being introduced for the use of compositions in ‘mechanical’ devices, such as 
phonographs, gramophones, piano players and music boxes. They argued that because 
of the high risks of their business they should be entitled to set their own royalty rates 
and choose which manufacturers could feature their compositions. The rhetorical tactic 
was not successful in this instance. The record companies campaigned successfully for a 
compulsory licence, resulting in a standard royalty rate and the removal of the 
publishers’ veto on the recording of their copyrighted compositions. 
 In 1928, at a subsequent UK inquiry into mechanical licensing, the publishers 
continued to maintain that they played the most ‘important role in bringing out and 
popularising a work’ and that, conversely, record companies ‘seldom if ever bring out a 
new work or procure its initial popularity’ (Report of Committee 1928: 9). William 
Boosey of Chappell & Co. claimed ‘only one song in forty which his firm published could 
really be described as a success’ (Peacock and Weir 1975: 43). The record companies 
admitted that publishers bore the primary ‘expense of making a work popular’, but 
were now stressing their own slim chances of making ‘more than two or three “hits” in a 
year’ (Report of Committee 1928: 19). They argued that there were ‘about 5,000 
Copyright titles in their catalogues’ and it ‘would be idle to suggest that all these are or 
have been popular successes’ (ibid.).  
 In Britain and America it was not until the 1950s that record sales overtook sales 
of sheet music (Garofalo 2005: 70). Counter-intuitively, it was at this point that it began 
to be suggested that ‘the real money is in the publishing’ (Stanley 2011). The publishers’ 
gains from recording royalties compensated their losses from sheet music income. In 
addition, their marketing costs were considerably reduced, as record companies 
increasingly took on the major costs of promotion. Correspondingly, while there is less 
evidence hereafter of publishers talking about success ratios, it was in this period that 
the recording industry’s one in ten statistic emerged. An early use can be found in 
Billboard, 21 July 1958. Bob Rolontz calculated that there were about 100 singles 
released in the American market each week, a figure he regarded as ‘overproduction’: 
 
Since less than 10 per cent of all records released become hits, and the figure is 
closer to 5 per cent than 10 per cent, the majority of them hardly sell at all. 
Possibly 60 per cent of all released sell 2,000 to 3,000. Another 20 per cent sell 
up to 25,000. And another 10 per cent sell 50,000 or more. The hit 10 per cent 
sell the 100,000 to 1,000,000 records. In other words 80 per cent of all records 
released are a loss for all concerned. (Rolontz 1958a: 1-4) 
 
From the outset we can witness two characteristics of the recording industry’s success 
ratio. First, it can be measured in different ways. Rolontz begins by examining the ratio 
of hits to releases but then addresses the profitability of records. The second is that it 
can vary. His article alternates between five per cent, ten per cent and twenty per cent. 
It is nevertheless the one in ten statistic that the business has most commonly 
employed. Rolontz used it in relation to albums in the following week’s Billboard, 
arguing that ‘true money making LP’s are certainly no more than 10 per cent of all 
released’ (1958b: 10). These early instances of the statistic are restricted to journalistic 
investigations and here it is used somewhat disparagingly. However, just as the 
publishers had done before them, the record companies would utilize failure for their 
own ends.   
 
The prevalence of the one in ten statistic 
The one in ten statistic has been employed in different territories and across different 
time periods. By the 1960s, it was being used in Britain; the Melody Maker asked, ‘If, as 
the record companies now admit, nine out of ten singles fail to make the Pop Fifty, what 
can the aspiring popper do to shorten the odds against his getting that elusive hit 
record’? (Anon. 1966: 8). It was still being employed in the UK thirty years later. In 
1994, the government’s Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) was informed by 
major record labels that ‘only one in ten of the pop artists with whom they sign 
contracts turns out to be successful’ (MMC 1994: s. 2.102). As we shall see, a great deal 
rested upon this statement, but it remained unchallenged and unverified by the MMC. 
British politicians were similarly biddable. In 1997, Chris Smith, who was then the 
Labour Party’s Culture Secretary, echoed industry claims that ‘On average, 80-90 per 
cent of artists signed to record companies will not succeed’ (1997: 81).  
Meanwhile, the ratio maintained its presence in the US. Its usage can be traced 
into the 1970s, when it was argued that ‘only 10 percent [of records] smelled “break 
even”’ (Denisoff 1975: 5). It was still being employed in the 1990s, when it was 
suggested that ‘Nine out of ten acts signed to record contracts are losers’ (Goodman 
1997: 232). Writing in 2014, Simon Napier-Bell summed up the statistic’s persistence: 
‘the ratio of success is what it always was – for every ten artists signed, nine will get 
nowhere. A contract with a major record company was always a 90 per cent guarantee 
of failure and it still is today’ (2014: 285). 
The endurance of the statistic could be considered remarkable. It has survived 
despite significant changes in record industry practice. Three factors in particular 
should have affected its consistency. The first is that the industry has gone through 
peaks and troughs. The common reaction of record companies during leaner times is to 
cut the size of their artist rosters and introduce more cautious signing policies. As a 
result there should be a higher ratio of hits to releases during hard times, at least if 
measured in relation to chart entries. The second is that the industry has moved from a 
model in which a major label was defined as an organization that had its own pressing 
plants and distribution networks, to one where there is there is less physical 
manufacture, most of which is undertaken by outside companies (Laing 2003: 621). In 
the 1970s, the majors’ manufacturing interests were viewed as a cause of 
overproduction, as these companies needed to generate sufficient product to keep their 
pressing plants busy (Denisoff 1975: 97-8). Manufacture also provided a platform from 
which to experiment. The majors pressed and distributed records for smaller 
companies, thus gaining a steady stream of income that safeguarded them against the 
‘adverse financial impact resulting from the considerable risk involved in speculative 
investment in new recording artists’ (Hill 1978: 32). Following on from this, some 
commentators have maintained that the majors took greater artistic chances when they 
were in the manufacturing business (Harrison 2017: 178). The third factor is that 
record companies have become increasingly sophisticated when it comes to consumer 
data. From an industry which did little audience analysis, we now have one that 
conducts detailed market research, taking full advantage of the digitization of consumer 
activity (Frith 2001: 34). Despite this wealth of data, the one in ten statistic has 
endured. 
The ratio is variable nonetheless. As we have moved through this time period it 
has less regularly been employed in relation to the ratio of hits to releases, which is just 
about quantifiable. Instead, it has been more commonly applied to the proportion of 
records that are profitable, or the number of artists whose contracts are renewed 
because they are providing sufficient returns. When it comes to profitability, we have to 
trust the record companies’ own calculations. They do not publicize precise sales 
figures for individual titles, nor do they detail the breakeven points of releases, which 
can vary widely. There has also been variation regarding which breakeven point they 
use. Sometimes they employ the statistic in relation to the recoupment of an artist’s 
personal, recording and video advances. At others they apply it to the overall 
expenditure on a release, adding in the costs of manufacture, distribution, marketing 
and promotion. What also gets obscured is the fact that artists and record companies 
have different breakeven points. A ‘failed’ record for an artist may be profitable for their 
record company. Interviewed in 1971, Warner Bros. executive Joe Smith admitted that 
his artists received a lower share of profits than his company did; therefore their debts 
took longer to pay off. He calculated that it would take sales of 100,000 albums for an 
artist to recoup ‘their advance and recording costs, and from then on they’re making 
money. But only 10 to 15 percent of the albums sell that well’ (Sanjek and Sanjek 1991: 
212). 
Some academics have questioned the veracity of success ratios. Writing in the 
1990s, Keith Negus reported an industry belief that only ‘one in eight’ artists recoup 
their advances. While arguing that this is ‘an elusive figure, hard to verify and as 
mythical as it is statistical’, he noted that some genres have a higher hit rate than others 
(1999: 47-50). In 2013, Lee Marshall listed a number of one in ten citations. He 
questioned their ‘seeming truism’ and suggested ‘the failure rate may not be as high as 
conventionally perceived’ (2013: 583, 584). Other academics have tested the ratios out. 
In the early 1970s, Simon Frith quantified ‘A Year of Singles in Britain’, finding a success 
rate of ‘about one in eleven’ (1974: 40). Jones undertook a similar exercise in 1995, 
tracking a week’s worth of single releases to monitor how many made the charts (1997: 
38-48). His main concern, however, was with the overall profitability of acts. Although 
he discovered a high rate of failure, he noted:  
  
Without knowing the extent of the recording and the promotional budgets for a 
new act; or the extent of recoupable debt for an ‘established’ act, we cannot 
know the sales target figure for a release by that act. Without knowing the sales 
target figure, and with no access to actual numbers of records sold, we can’t 
judge whether the act in question is regarded by their label as either succeeding 
or failing. (1997: 47) 
 
Although the statistic has remained much the same, the academic accounts of it have 
changed. In the 1970s and 1980s it was used as evidence of the ‘mud against the wall’ 
approach to releasing music, whereby labels issued a large array of titles hoping some 
would stick as hits (Chapple and Garofalo 1977: 14). Bernard Miège drew pessimistic 
conclusions from this scenario, claiming that it resulted in job insecurity and 
impecuniosity for artists (1989: 89-90). In contrast, Frith saw it as evidence of 
consumer sovereignty (1978: 97). David Hesmondhalgh added a further view, arguing 
that the signing policies of these decades resulted in ‘a substantial degree of artistic 
innovation and experimentation’ (2013: 249).  
By the 1990s the costs of recording, promoting and marketing records had 
increased considerably (Negus 1992: 40). This was also the era in which more 
sophisticated methods of audience and sales analysis took hold. Negus detailed how this 
resulted in ‘a straightforward reluctance to experiment, a reduction in risk-taking and a 
propensity towards a partial view of the world’ (1999: 52), while Jones suggested that 
record companies were no longer involved in ‘overproduction’; they were instead ‘over-
signing’ new acts (1997: 313). This policy was considered to be more cost-effective. 
Although record companies would ‘initiate the commodification of a number of 
commodities’ they would ‘choose to concentrate marketing and promotional resources 
on only a proportion of these on the basis of “intelligence” garnered from the market 
place’ (ibid.: 149). The essential point of analysis was no longer what happened once a 
record was in the market, but the system of prioritization that had taken place before it 
was released. 
Building on these studies, some writers have suggested that record companies 
have a systematic approach to failure. By 2001, Frith was viewing success ratios in a 
new light. He asked, ‘What if a record’s failure reflects not the irrational activities of 
musicians and consumers but the perfectly rational activities of record companies 
themselves?’ (2001: 47). In contemplating why a record company would choose not to 
promote some of its artists, he outlined the following areas of policy: ‘the development 
of the portfolio management structure; the carefully orchestrated programme of global 
release and promotion; the calculation of what budgets are available for what products 
when; a sense at any one moment of to which project is makes most sense to devote 
energy’ (ibid.: 48). Marshall has gone further, stating that ‘the high failure rate 
associated with the record labels can [...] have some beneficial aspects for labels’ (2013: 
584). He points out that it ‘serves important rhetorical purposes in relation to 
governments, policy makers, and consumers, and [...] in contractual negotiations with 
its artists’ (ibid.). 
 
Uses and abuses of the one in ten statistic 
Marshall is correct; the one in ten statistic has been tactically employed. In Britain, the 
MMC’s 1994 report The Supply of Recorded Music provides a rare insight into industry 
policy. Here the statistic is used in defence of the record companies’ ownership of sound 
recording copyright and their restrictive contractual clauses. The report states at its 
outset that ‘Copyright is central to the operations of the record industry’ (MMC 1994: s. 
1.4). The International Managers Forum (IMF) pointed out to the MMC that ‘the 
copyright catalogues of the record companies are their most valuable asset’ (ibid.: s. 
8.35).  
The companies’ claims upon sound recording copyright were contestable, 
however. In British law, ownership is awarded to the ‘producer’, defined as ‘the person 
by whom the arrangements necessary for the making of the sound recording are 
undertaken’ (Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988: s. 9.2aa). The record companies 
argued that 
 
The courts had held that the word ‘undertake’ meant ‘be responsible for’, 
especially in the financial sense but also generally. It could therefore be assumed 
that [...] Parliament had intended that copyright should vest in the person who 
had undertaken the financial responsibility for making the recording. The 
ownership of that copyright was the reward for the risk they had undertaken. 
(MMC 1994: s. 12.108) 
 
It is nevertheless rare for record companies to undertake the financial risk or 
organizational responsibilities on their own. Artists’ recording budgets are usually 
issued in the form of advances. The record companies claw these advances back from 
the artists’ royalties: they are ‘recoupable’. In addition, artists will regularly make their 
own arrangements for recording projects. They will source independent studios and 
independent record producers. They will also select session musicians themselves. If 
the companies’ own interpretation of the law is correct, then it is possible to interpret it 
as positing recouped recording artists as at least the co-owners of copyright in sound 
recordings. They have contributed to the general and financial arrangements.  
 The record companies provided one further rationale for their ownership of 
sound recording copyright, however. They argued to the MMC that only one in ten of 
their artists would achieve profitability, while the remaining 90 per cent would have 
their losses written off (ibid.: s. 2.102). Highlighting this statistic, the companies 
suggested that they bore the responsibility for financing the totality of sound 
recordings. As such, they deserved the copyrights of the few successes to compensate 
for the losses of the many failures.  
 The companies’ claims did not end there. They maintained that, in compensation 
for the low success rate, their artists should be tied for long contractual periods and 
should not be entitled to record for rival record companies (ibid.: s. 2.41). After hearing 
evidence from each of the major record companies, the MMC decided:  
 
It was only by concluding contracts which embodied such terms as retention of 
copyright, exclusivity and a reasonable length of contract term that the 
companies could reap the necessary long-term benefits for those few artists who 
succeeded and that the artists who succeeded could reap the long-term benefits 
in their development and career. (ibid.: s. 12.99) 
 
Yet record companies’ bear much of the responsibility for this rate of failure. One reason 
why the majority of signings have failed to recoup is because advances have been high. 
The labels have escalated these payments as a means of outpacing their competitors. 
Jeff Ayeroff of Warner Bros. has stated ‘If there’s a band that we want, that Interscope 
want or that DreamWorks wants, we want it really badly [...] and we will pay the money 
to get it, making the risk higher’ (Stahl 2013: 164). Speaking to the MMC, one of the 
labels spoke of setting advances at a level ‘necessary to persuade the artist to accept the 
offer in preference to a rival record company’ (1994: s.11.5). The companies suggested 
that, for artists, high advances and copyright ownership should be considered mutually 
exclusive. This argument was nevertheless reliant on the failure of the majority of 
artists to recoup.  
Another reason why so many recordings have failed to achieve profitability is 
because of the high costs of marketing and promotion. Yet these costs are high because 
there are so many records. Broadcasters, journalists and other intermediaries are faced 
with a plethora of releases. One way to filter them is to assess marketing expenditure. 
Marshall notes that ‘failing to spend substantial amounts on independent promoters 
makes it look like the label is not serious about a record, thus dooming it to failure’ 
(2013: 583). This expenditure has enabled major record companies to exercise their 
power. In America, for example, there have been times when promotion has become so 
expensive that only the largest labels can afford it, thus providing ‘a means to keep 
small companies off the charts’ (Dannen 2003: 264). 
It is the major record companies, ultimately, who have set the bar for the success 
ratio so high, but they have argued that they deserve compensation for its effects. In 
doing so, they have received ample rewards. In Britain, their contractual policies 
garnered official approval from the MMC, while their ownership of copyright has 
received scant investigation. To achieve this, however, they have had to make their 
failure rate appear noble. This is where the rhetoric of new music has come in. 
 
New music 
New music and success ratios have long been considered in tandem. As an example, 
they are brought together in the 21 July 1958 Billboard article cited above. Rolontz 
believed that overproduction had a negative effect on new acts, arguing that record 
companies provided them with little ‘staying power’ as they were constantly looking for 
acts that were newer still (1958a: 4). 
Overproduction came to be viewed more positively. The Supply of Recorded 
Music includes a benevolent self-portrayal of the record companies’ contracts and 
copyrights. The labels defended their economic system on the grounds that it would 
facilitate the sponsorship of new British performers: 
 
If material modifications were made to the key provisions in recording contracts, 
dealing in particular with the extent of copyright acquired by the record 
company, the length of the contract and the exclusivity provisions imposed on 
the artist, then the companies would be forced to take a much more short-term 
view of their relationship with artists, which would not only be detrimental to 
the long-term development of those artists, but which would inevitably mean 
that the companies would not be able to invest as widely in new UK artists as 
they did at present. (MMC 1994: s. 12.103) 
 
This line of reasoning was promoted further in the 1990s, as dialogue between British 
record companies and governments increased. Writing about this period, Martin 
Cloonan notes that ‘key people in the popular music industries came to realize that 
politicians needed to be lobbied’ (2007: 21). In part this was because their industries 
were being addressed (The Supply of Recorded Music was one of a number of official 
investigations). It was also because governments were keen to open discussions. Their 
interest was reflective of an era in which the profits of heavy industry had declined 
while those of the cultural industries had grown (ibid.: 39). 
 Cloonan argues that the record companies were in need of ‘an image-building 
exercise’, adding that ‘Clearly at a time when cultural policy was increasingly becoming 
part of economic policy and when the music industries seemingly felt some unease 
about stressing pop’s cultural value, the pragmatic response was to make the economic 
case’ (ibid.: 75). The argument they made was nevertheless balanced between the two. 
While the record companies promoted their economic worth, they also sought 
protection. In doing so, their talk of new music leant more towards its artistic qualities 
than to financial policy. There was no mention of portfolio management or budget 
calculations; instead there was an emphasis on the risk-taking nature of supporting the 
new. There was less talk about the search for the next blockbuster acts than there was 
about promoting the marginal, the challenging and the forward-looking. The companies 
stressed they were signing ‘creative’ artists, issuing ‘innovative music’ and sponsoring 
acts with ‘minority appeal’ (MMC 1994: s. 11.29, 12.79, 12.105).  
As Cloonan states, the ‘music industries’ commonsense view of the world’ began 
to permeate British governments (2007: 41). Research undertaken by Negus and Jones 
in the late 1990s documented a system of tight financial control and restricted musical 
innovation. It was in this same period, however, that the record companies stressed 
they were risk taking. This tactic was employed in one of the first investigations into the 
record business in this era, the National Heritage Committee’s 1993 inquiry into CD 
prices. The major companies suggested they were involved in ‘a high risk business’. The 
Committee only noted that they ‘can be’, however (ibid., p. 70).  The Supply of Recorded 
Music, published the following year, evidences a new level of accord with the recording 
industry. There was now agreement that it was a ‘high-risk business’, driven by the 
search for new artists (1994: s. 1.13). 
The record companies had much to gain by highlighting their audacious deeds. 
Risk-taking was used in defence of their ownership of sound recording copyright: the 
MMC conceded that ‘since the record companies take the risk of investing in artists 
when they are unknown, they should not have the rewards taken away on those 
occasions when their investment turns out to be successful’ (ibid.: s. 2.140). It also 
supported their system of exclusive, long-term contracts: the companies argued that 
they provided the platform from which ‘to take the very significant risks in investing in 
new artists’ (ibid.: s. 12.99). 
Although the MMC endorsed these claims, the record companies’ suggestions did 
not go uncontested. Giving evidence to the Commission, the IMF questioned the record 
labels’ quantification of success. They argued that the one in ten success ratio was based 
on a short-term analysis of an artist’s profitability, pointing to the fact that a record 
company would retain copyright in a sound recording for 50 years, regardless of 
whether an artist remained signed to them throughout the whole of that period.1 
Therefore, it could accrue income long after an artist had been dropped on account of 
non-profitability. They noted that, whereas the losses from ‘unsuccessful’ artists would 
be detailed in company balance sheets, the value of their copyright catalogues would 
not appear there (ibid.: s. 8.35). The IMF proposed a shorter duration for the record 
companies’ control of sound recording copyright, suggesting a period of ten years, after 
which the rights would revert to the artist. This, they believed, would give artists 
greater bargaining power in their negotiations with the industry, as the value of these 
copyrights would reduce the need to ‘obtain capital [...] on disadvantageous terms’ 
                                                     
1 In 2011 the European Union issued a directive that increased the term of sound recording 
copyright in member countries to 70 years. In their efforts to achieve this result, British 
record companies made much of their risk-taking investment in new music (Osborne 2017: 
404-406). 
(ibid.: s. 10.50).  
 The record companies’ benevolent self-portrayal has been questioned elsewhere. 
Miles Copeland, who has had a successful career as a manager and as a head of 
independent record labels, suggests that ‘If you’re trying to build a record company, and 
you’re trying to build an asset, what you really try to do is you try to find a young artist 
that you can sign and develop’ (Stahl 2013: 155). For Copeland, these are ‘the riskiest 
ones’, but they are also ‘where you’re going to get the most return. When I go to the 
marketplace to try to borrow additional money, or get investment in my company, 
they’re going to look at what are the potential returns of [my] company’ (ibid.: 155). 
New artists have offered good returns because they have been contractually 
weak. In a competitive business, in which only a small proportion of artists are 
successful and an even smaller proportion is signed, prospective artists have had little 
bargaining power. Until recently, those who managed to secure record company 
interest would generally be on lower royalty rates than established artists and their 
contracts would contain a greater number of restrictive clauses (Dannen 2003: 79; 
Negus 1992: 149-50). Leslie F. Hill, while a director at EMI, conceded that new artists 
had ‘the greatest profit potential for the company’ (1978: 35). 
In their dialogue with governments, record companies have claimed that their 
ownership of copyright and restrictive contractual system support the creation of new 
music. The reverse is also true. The rhetoric of new music supports the record 
companies’ system of ownership and control. A measure of the companies’ faith in this 
rhetoric is that it has been adopted by IFPI, their global trade body. Moreover, 
investment in new music is now being used for an all-encompassing cause: to explain 
the continued need for record companies themselves. 
 
Investing in new music 
In the twenty-first century, the profitability of record companies has fallen. IFPI has 
charted a decline in global income from US$ 27.3bn in 1999 to US$ 19.1bn in 2018 (IFPI 
2012b: 7; IFPI 2019: 13). The organization has nevertheless argued that if an artist 
wants to achieve success, the best chance of doing so is to sign with a record company. 
This claim has been made most forcibly in IFPI’s Investing in Music reports, issued in 
2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016. Ann Harrison believes that the aim of these documents has 
been to ‘debunk suggestions that an artist can develop careers in the business without 
needing a label’ (2017: 61). The reports admit as much, maintaining ‘There has been a 
mistaken belief among some that the role of labels would be diminished in the digital 
age’ (IFPI 2014: 6).  
 In making their case, IFPI have stressed that new artists are at the heart of 
record companies’ concerns; each report stresses they are the ‘lifeblood’ of the industry 
(2010: 6-7; 2012a: 7, 9; 2014: 6; 2016: 10). They offer daunting figures about the 
amount of money it costs to break a new act. A spend of ‘between US$200,000 and 
US$500,000’ in 2012 had risen to ‘between US$0.5 million and US$2 million’ by 2016 
(2012Aa: 11; 2016: 6). Marketing is shown as taking the lion’s share of industry 
expenditure, reaching US$200,000-700,000 per new act in 2016 (2016: 6). What 
remains unstated is that these high costs can at least be partially attributed to the 
companies’ promotional wars, which are in turn related to the fact that more artists are 
signed than will succeed.  
There is one concession to previous practice, however. The one in ten ratio has 
been revised. Left as it was, it could have been taken as evidence that record companies 
are not viable. Why sign with them if there is only a slim chance you will succeed? 
Consequently, the 2012 report tells us ‘the most common estimate cited by senior music 
company management is a success ratio of one in five. This is more than the commonly 
estimated one in ten ratio of a decade ago, reflecting a generally higher success rate 
than was previously the norm’ (2012a: 11).2 However, just as record companies 
provided little evidence for their earlier statistic, this revision is offered without proof.  
The ratio is balanced with the idea that record labels support a ‘wide community 
of artists, many of whom will not be commercially successful’ (2010: 5). Failure is 
employed as a means of demonstrating altruistic ways. IFPI claim that, while 
‘Continually investing in new talent is a hugely risky business’, it is record companies 
who ‘shoulder the financial risk inherent in trying to break a new act’ (2010: 6; 2014: 
5). According to Nick Raphael, president of Capitol Records UK: 
 
We put just as much effort and money, if not more so, into the acts that don’t 
succeed as with those that do. There may be any number of reasons why they 
don’t connect with the audience, but it is not for lack of effort and support from 
labels that want them to succeed. (2014: 9)  
 
There is no mention of the strategic prioritization of acts. The reports claim instead that 
‘longterm’ contractual involvement is of benefit to artists, as it allows them ‘to develop 
their own brand identity and earn a living from different sources’ (2010: 7).  
It is not just prospective artists who are expected to read these reports, but also 
policy makers. To this end, IFPI claim that investment in new music benefits ‘the 
economy as a whole’ and record companies have ‘sustained their investment in artists 
                                                     
2 The 2010 report states that ‘Estimates of the success ratio vary between one in five and 
one in ten (2010: 7). Curiously, the 2016 report returns to this state of uncertainty, stating, 
‘Some labels estimate the ratio of commercial success to failure as 1 in 4; others consider 
the chances to be much lower – less than 1 in 10’ (2016: 10). 
despite the significant fall-off in overall sales revenue’ (2010: 5, 7). The reports boast 
how record companies invest more money in ‘research and development’ than the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology sector (2012a: 9; 2014: 9). In order to continue this 
practice, the companies’ ownership of copyright must be maintained: 
 
It is copyright that makes investment in music possible. It is copyright that 
allows the industry that helps artists gain a return on its investment, and 
therefore plough back new funds and resources into the next generation of 
talent. And it is copyright which underlies the endeavours, the risks and the 
successes that fill the pages of this report. (2014: 4) 
 
The 2014 Investing in Music report comes close to declaring the record companies’ self-
interest. Placido Domingo, Chairman of IFPI, states that ‘instead of calling this report 
Investing in Music, it could also be titled Investing in Copyright’ (2014: 4). For the most 
part, however, this investment is not discussed as resulting in something that the record 
companies will profit from or own. The suggestion, instead, is that any income derived 
from copyright will be ploughed back into the future. IFPI claim that the majority of 
record companies’ copyright income is spent on new music, as labels ‘reinvest the 
proceeds of successful campaigns in the discovery and nurturing of the next generation 
of talent’ (2012a: 7). In reaching this formulation, they provide a phrase that record 
companies have grasped for in each of their campaigns and reports. What they are 
peddling is a ‘virtuous cycle of investment’ (2010: 5). This honourable inflection has 
been implied whenever they have combined the rhetoric of their success rate with their 
rhetoric of newness. 
 
Conclusion 
The economic wellbeing of record companies has been aided by their employment of 
two rhetorical tropes. The first is that only one in ten artists succeeds; the second is that 
they are supporters of new music. Both are problematic. The labels’ success ratios 
require verification and their nurturing abilities can be questioned. Artists who are not 
prioritized for promotion would hardly recommend their companies’ virtues, while 
those who do succeed can find themselves paying for the losers. Moreover, record 
companies might be signing new artists, quantitatively, but this does not mean that 
their music is new, qualitatively. In the current century, for example, theories of 
‘retromania’ have taken hold (Reynolds 2011). 
 This is not to say that either trope is baseless. The careers of most artists will end 
in failure and the record companies will write-off these artists’ losses. There is also an 
element of truth in the companies’ risk-taking propaganda. Until recently it has been 
hard to test their claims because there have been few alternatives to their policies. This 
hegemony is finally being challenged. The past decade has witnessed the rise of service 
companies, such as Kobalt, who perform many of the functions of a traditional record 
company but do not own their artists’ copyrights. How can they afford this? The charge 
originally levelled against them is that they could only do so because they were not 
taking risks; they were forgoing copyrights because their deals were reserved for 
‘heritage’ artists with proven track records (Anon. 2015: 9). Nevertheless, it is now 
becoming possible for new performers, on a variety of types of record deal, to own their 
own copyrights. Some of them are also reversing previous practice by gaining better 
royalty rates than the artists who have preceded them (Ingham 2019). The reason why 
they can do this, however, is because they are not exactly new. These artists have 
established their dedicated coteries of followers (both online and in person) before 
contracting with a record company. It is these levels of experience that provide them 
with their negotiating power.  
 These changes do not negate the need to monitor record company practice. The 
vast majority of artists remain on long-term, exclusive contracts and they do not own 
their sound recording copyrights. The record companies have upheld this position via 
arguments about failure and novelty. One reason why they have not received sufficient 
questioning is because of the high success rate of their rhetoric.  
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